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The US alliance already constrains Australia to the extent that we are unable to pursue our own strategic interests.
Where US foreign policy is concerned, I am generally one to err on the side of caution. Past US governments are not exactly what we would refer to as liberals with a healthy dose of respect for the sovereignty of other nations, and for the most part, US foreign policy can most certainly be viewed as, broadly speaking, realist. Part of that means the formation of strategic alliances that are in the interests of the US, and one such treaty is ANZUS, which forms the basis for Australian-US relations. The point about ANZUS isn’t the fact that it doesn’t actually guarantee Australia any protection from the US, but rather that its existence is not evidence of a sense of shared history and culture on the part of the US so much as it is evidence that we are a practical investment in the south Pacific. When Britain abandoned Australia in the Pacific after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese during the Second World War, it is far from the truth that the US then came in guns blazing to save us from the yellow peril of the Japanese. At the time, it just so happened to be that US interests - maintaining the independence of a ‘friendly’ nation at the expense of the Japanese - just happened to be the same as ours at that time. To reiterate, we must not be under any illusion that the US’ strong ties with us are anything other than purely strategic in nature. To an extent, however, the reverse is also true. Rhetoric about the ‘insurance policy’ and ‘great and powerful friend’ is commonplace in discussions about Australian foreign policy and one could quite confidently say that this forms the basis for Australian-US relations.
So if I’m calling for recognition of the fact that our relationship is purely strategic, I should be pretty well satisfied, right? Wrong. It goes beyond recognition, because it seems to be that Australian foreign policy has conveniently glossed over the potential downsides - which look more and more likely to eventuate each day - of such a close relationship with the US. The fact is that during both the Cold War andd today’s war on terror, we have never been targets for any reason other than our tacist support for the US and its interests. What made us a potential target for the USSR was US bases on Australian soil, what makes us a target for terrorism is our participation in the war in Afghanistan (also in Iraq) as well as our government’s support for Israel. What becomes clear is that we have taken out an insurance policy from an insurer which creates our need for said insurance in the first place. This is more than a little counter-intuitive.
This blog post was mostly inspired by this frighteningly sycophantic piece from Jonathan Kolieb in the National Times this week. As I set pen to paper, intending to write a full response to that article, I discovered that I have a lot of feelings about the alliance that go beyond that article alone. But in this instance I will engage with one sentence, in which Kolieb asserts that “political and economic power is shifting to our neck of the woods”, being the Asia-Pacific region. Now, I may disagree with the conclusions he draws from that fact, but he is absolutely correct in that assertion. Which is exactly why we should take the opportunity to build closer cultural, economic and military relations with our Asian neighbours, the growing powerhouses that will shape the 21st century. Indonesia in particular is an old ally we have sorely neglected in recent times, and Rudd’s deal with the Yudhoyono government over the Oceanic Viking in 2009 seemed like a case of dumping our dirty laundry on them. Julia Gillard’s errors in dealing with East Timor over a regional processing centre for asylum seekers were, at the very least, similarly embarassing. But by being in favour of regional engagement, I do not suggest we replace our current ‘great and powerful friend’ with an Asian power, but rather that we dispense with the concept altogether. Insurance policies and the like serve only to constrain us in terms of foreign policy and strip Australia of its autonomy in such matters. We are a middle power well-positioned to carve an independent foreign policy niche in accordance with our - and nobody else’s - strategic interests.
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Malcolm Fraser’s cabinet was warned in 1980 that boosting its military ties with the US could put Australia at risk of a nuclear attack and expose it to involvement it in American operations contrary to its national interest, secret cabinet documents show.
The documents, released today by the National Archives, also detail defence minister Jim Killen’s thoughts on Australia’s offer of military help to the US, which he described as having “improved Australia’s status as a worthwhile ally” and increased Australia’s access to US policy making.
In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Australia was keen to show support for its US ally and significantly increased its defence budget.
Early in the year during a trip to the US, prime minister Malcolm Fraser offered the US access to Australian defence facilities such as the Naval Base at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia and the use of landing facilities for B-52 bombers in Darwin.
Cabinet also agreed to bolster Defence activities in the Indian Ocean through surveillance, patrolling, extra equipment and facilities and upgrading infrastructure.
And it decided to speed up completion of several new projects such as the upgrading of weapons systems on F-111s and the acquisition of 75 new tactical fighters and expansion of Army reserve.
While the cabinet was adamant on showing strong resolve against Soviet expansion, Minister Killen noted in a submission to cabinet in July that the use of the Cockburn Sound base, which was not far from Perth, might increase the risk of nuclear attack.
While he acknowledged that the offer of broad support served the common interests of the US and Australia, he warned that there could be political consequences.
“Because of anxieties about national security, queries about US policies and our involvement with them and unease over the question of national control over our international involvements, there could be a sharpening of political division over cooperation with the US and erosion of bipartisan support for defence policy,” he wrote.
Minister Killen was also concerned about the use of Australian facilities by the US for operations that had nothing to do with the deterrence of the Soviets.
In July he asked cabinet to consider whether the government would want to distinguish its dealings with the US over matters relevant to USSR deterrence and other US operations.
“The operation of US military units from Australian territory could, therefore, involve a reduction of national control over Australia’s international involvements,” he wrote.
“Supporting common interests with so large a power as the US risks involvement beyond, and perhaps in conflict with national interests”.
And he also described potential US deployments as being “essentially token for the deterrence of the USSR”.
Minutes of August 15 show that Cabinet agreed on what conditions Australia may impose on staging operations of US if a request was received, such as the frequency of operations and whether nuclear weapons would be allowed into the country.
Later in August cabinet also mulled the broader issue of whether Australia should deploy its troops to “the more remote areas of the world” beyond defence of Australian territory.
Mr Killen also noted that he did not want Australia to divert defence spending on equipment and training on operations that were not relevant to Australia.
The only real threat Australia faces, then and now, is as an ally of the US.
HANDS UP ALL WHO ARE SURPRISED.
Cabinet papers are released 30 years after the fact, which is why the most interesting things that’ll be in the news for the next few days will be pondering over the 1980 papers.
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The US embassy in Canberra, November 2009
YOU FUCKING ARSEHOLES. WHO WOULD YOU PREFER TO FORMULATE OUR FOREIGN POLICY? YOU? WELL WHY JUST STOP AT FOREIGN POLICY? WHY DON’T YOU JUST ABSORB OUR ENTIRE GOVERNMENT IF WE’RE TOO INCOMPETENT TO DO IT OURSELVES?
Fuck you very much, US. Although it’s nice to know what you really think of us. Cheers, Wikileaks!
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